Current Account Balance (% GDP, 3 yr avg) | Upper MIP Threshold | Lower MIP Threshold | |
2009 | -5.8 | 6 | -4 |
2010 | -4 | 6 | -4 |
2011 | -2.5 | 6 | -4 |
2012 | -2.1 | 6 | -4 |
2013 | -1.2 | 6 | -4 |
2014 | -0.3 | 6 | -4 |
2015 | 2.3 | 6 | -4 |
2016 | 0.4 | 6 | -4 |
2017 | 0.2 | 6 | -4 |
2018 | 2.3 | 6 | -4 |
Source publication: International Accounts Q2 2019
Get the data: StatBank BPA15 (Current Account), StatBank N1805 (Gross Domestic Product)
The current account balance is mainly driven by exports less imports, although it also includes net income and current transfers in and out of Ireland, as shown in the CSO note on Trends in Net Factor Income. As part of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), the current account balance is expressed as a percentage of GDP and presented as a three year average. A positive current account balance usually indicates that exports are greater than imports and vice versa. From 2009 to 2014, Ireland ran a current account deficit (measured as a three year average) and breached the lower MIP threshold in 2009 and 2010. The value of this indicator increased year on year from 2010-2015. A surplus was recorded in 2015 as a result of the relocation of companies to Ireland and their associated contract manufacturing exports. The modest surpluses in 2016 and 2017 were mainly due to increased R&D related IP imports in those years. While a strong surplus resumed in 2018 due to lower R&D related IP imports combined with increased computer service exports.
Supplementary analysis:
Current Account Balance (% GDP, 3 yr avg) | Modified Current Account Balance (CA*) (% GDP, 3 yr avg) | Upper MIP Threshold | Lower MIP Threshold | |
2009 | -5.8 | -5 | 6 | -4 |
2010 | -4 | -4.1 | 6 | -4 |
2011 | -2.5 | -2.5 | 6 | -4 |
2012 | -2.1 | -2.4 | 6 | -4 |
2013 | -1.2 | -1.8 | 6 | -4 |
2014 | -0.3 | -1.1 | 6 | -4 |
2015 | 2.3 | 0.6 | 6 | -4 |
2016 | 0.4 | 1.5 | 6 | -4 |
2017 | 0.2 | 2.2 | 6 | -4 |
2018 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 6 | -4 |
Source publication: Modified Current Account Balance for Ireland
A new measure of Irish domestic economic activity was requested by the CSO’s Economic Statistics Review Group (ESRG) due to the recent difficulty of interpreting gross domestic product (GDP). This was mainly due to the impact on GDP of mobile international assets and global firms redomiciling their headquarters to Ireland. The development of a modified current balance, CA*, has been the CSO’s response concerning the balance of payments (BOP) data. CA* is the current account balance (CA) adjusted as follows:
CA* = CA less (depreciation on R&D service imports and trade in IP + aircraft leasing depreciation + redomiciled incomes + R&D related IP exports) adding back (net aircraft related to leasing + R&D related IP imports + R&D service imports)
Because it is borne by foreign investors, the depreciation of foreign-owned capital (such as trade in IP and aircraft leasing) is excluded from, and thus does not affect, CA*. The retained earnings of redomiciled firms are predominantly owned by foreign investors and are not taken into account by CA* either. Finally, some firms borrow money abroad to finance their investment by purchasing IP from their parent company. In the long-term, this debt is repaid from the profit on the IP or the aircraft being leased. This borrowing is not a liability of residents of Ireland and the purchase of this IP is excluded when deriving CA*.
As part of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), both CA and CA* are expressed as a three-year average in terms of a percentage of GDP. From the above figure we can observe that from 2012 to 2015, CA* was lower than CA. This difference is mainly due to the increase of redomiciled incomes. The decrease in the current account from 2015 (2.3%) to 2016 (0.4%) changed to an increase for CA* between 2015 (0.6%) and 2016 (1.5%). In 2017, a value of 2.2% for CA* was observed, compared to 0.2% for CA and in 2018 CA* stood at 2.8% compared to a value of 2.3% for CA. The increase in the current account balance from 2017 (€1,457m) to 2018 (€34,292m), mainly due to the reduction of R&D related IP imports has reduced the gap between CA and CA*. Note that CA* as a percentage of GNI* would show a similar trend to that of CA* as a percentage of GDP, but with movements of slightly greater magnitude since GNI* is a smaller aggregate. More information on the modified current account balance can be found here.
Net IIP (% GDP) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | -115.656110193356 | -35 |
2010 | -113.527942237406 | -35 |
2011 | -139.3 | -35 |
2012 | -137.760952811726 | -35 |
2013 | -133.449473015352 | -35 |
2014 | -164.700727541274 | -35 |
2015 | -198.414267209941 | -35 |
2016 | -171.665852959992 | -35 |
2017 | -167.215898530155 | -35 |
2018 | -165.036411870129 | -35 |
Source publication: International Accounts Q2 2019
Get the data: StatBank BPQ26 (IIP), StatBank N1805 (GDP)
The net IIP is calculated as the value of financial assets of residents of an economy that are claims on non-residents, and gold bullion held as reserve assets, less the liabilities of residents of an economy to non-residents
Ireland's net IIP as a percentage of GDP has breached the MIP threshold in every year shown in the series above.
Supplementary analysis:
General Government | Central Bank | Monetary Financial Institutions | Non-Financial Corporations | Other Sectors | Net IIP | MIP Threshold | |
2012 | -61.5991031888878 | -44.4095099468679 | -0.554515569593726 | -66.7273760950812 | 35.5295519887043 | -137.760952811726 | -35 |
2013 | -60.3422934273698 | -28.5807880291616 | -6.67877688831504 | -66.0573430138952 | 28.2097283433893 | -133.449473015352 | -35 |
2014 | -67.7426612229187 | -8.80126486692844 | -1.30526595647048 | -98.2390828225034 | 11.387547327547 | -164.700727541274 | -35 |
2015 | -50.3638247647842 | 0.964118835985113 | 4.60329014363986 | -165.205494313574 | 11.5876428887923 | -198.414267209941 | -35 |
2016 | -45.8996783753004 | 2.17508547502724 | 8.80479809821994 | -158.827859876667 | 22.081801718728 | -171.665852959992 | -35 |
2017 | -41.369519689962 | 3.78316278330314 | 13.5288071044134 | -150.388210977136 | 7.2298622492268 | -167.215898530155 | -35 |
2018 | -38.4165075590173 | 7.44099538636561 | 15.8971639881187 | -141.94437728517 | -8.01368640042652 | -165.036411870129 | -35 |
Get the data: StatBank BPQ22 (IIP), StatBank N1805 (GDP)
Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3 above show the contribution of various sectors to the Net IIP as a percentage of GDP. Non-financial corporations contribute the most in every year and their contribution to the net IIP has more than doubled between 2012 and 2015, mainly due to the non-resident financing of domestic intellectual property. Further information on this is contained in the CSO's National Balance Sheet publication. The contribution of general government to the net international investment position has fallen from a high of -67.7% in 2014 to -38.4% in 2018.
REER | Upper MIP Threshold | Lower MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 5.2 | 5 | -5 |
2010 | -5.4 | 5 | -5 |
2011 | -9.6 | 5 | -5 |
2012 | -12.2 | 5 | -5 |
2013 | -3.8 | 5 | -5 |
2014 | -3.6 | 5 | -5 |
2015 | -6.4 | 5 | -5 |
2016 | -7.1 | 5 | -5 |
2017 | -6.3 | 5 | -5 |
2018 | 2.3 | 5 | -5 |
Get the data: Eurostat database
The real effective exchange rate (REER) is a country’s exchange rate relative to a basket of exchange rates of other countries weighted according to their respective trade shares. A change in it, therefore, aims to assess a country's price or cost competitiveness relative to its principal competitors in international markets. A positive value indicates real appreciation and a loss of country competitiveness relative to principal trading partners. A negative value indicates improving country competitiveness relative to its principal trading partners. Changes in cost and price competitiveness depend on cost and price trends as well as exchange rate movements. This specific REER for the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure is deflated by the consumer price indices relative to a panel of 42 countries. The three year percentage change in the REER estimate for 2009, at 5.2%, breached the upper MIP threshold. From 2010 to 2012, the lower MIP threshold of -5% was breached, followed by a recovery period during 2013 and 2014. Since then, the indicator breached the lower threshold each year until 2018. The three year percentage change in REER for 2018, at 2.3%, neither breached the upper nor the lower threshold.
Supplementary analysis:
Ireland | EU28 | Germany | Netherlands | United Kingdom | United States | |
2009 | 5.2 | 5.40714285714286 | 2.9 | 2.7 | -19.9 | -4.75458164596101 |
2010 | -5.4 | -0.0107142857142856 | -3.8 | -1.5 | -20.4 | -4.66485705258032 |
2011 | -9.6 | -2.52142857142857 | -4.9 | -2.4 | -7.8 | -5.41152491116528 |
2012 | -12.2 | -4.28928571428571 | -9 | -6 | 6 | -6.99772739974653 |
2013 | -3.8 | -0.721428571428572 | -1.8 | 0.5 | 3.4 | -2.46579679770311 |
2014 | -3.6 | -0.635714285714286 | -0.4 | 0.7 | 10.1 | 4.37418827443337 |
2015 | -6.4 | -1.42857142857143 | -1.5 | -0.9 | 10.7 | 12.827164409957 |
2016 | -7.1 | -2.1 | -2.1 | -2.3 | 0.2 | 17.2152826909562 |
2017 | -6.3 | -2.00357142857143 | -2 | -1.8 | -10.8 | 15.0079928048933 |
2018 | 2.3 | 2.98928571428571 | 5.3 | 3.2 | -13 | 2.82259155960985 |
Get the data: Eurostat database, World Bank database
The pattern of Ireland’s REER has been similar to other Euro area countries and to the EU-28 average. However, it has been different to those of the United Kingdom and the USA where other currencies are in circulation. It is important to note that data on the USA is calculated in a different way to Eurostat and therefore is not fully comparable. The indicator for the USA is computed using data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, as a three year percentage change.
REER (3 yr % change) | Upper MIP Threshold | Lower MIP Threshold | |
United Kingdom | -13 | 5 | -5 |
Sweden | -4 | 5 | -5 |
Romania | -0.7 | 5 | -5 |
Poland | 0.1 | 5 | -5 |
Cyprus | 1.8 | 5 | -5 |
Hungary | 2 | 5 | -5 |
Slovenia | 2 | 5 | -5 |
Ireland | 2.3 | 5 | -5 |
Slovakia | 2.5 | 5 | -5 |
Denmark | 2.6 | 5 | -5 |
Finland | 3 | 5 | -5 |
Portugal | 3.1 | 5 | -5 |
Netherlands | 3.2 | 5 | -5 |
Italy | 3.3 | 5 | -5 |
Luxembourg | 3.3 | 5 | -5 |
Greece | 3.6 | 5 | -5 |
Bulgaria | 3.9 | 5 | -5 |
Spain | 4.1 | 5 | -5 |
Croatia | 4.2 | 5 | -5 |
France | 4.5 | 5 | -5 |
Austria | 4.8 | 5 | -5 |
Latvia | 4.9 | 5 | -5 |
Malta | 4.9 | 5 | -5 |
Germany | 5.3 | 5 | -5 |
Lithuania | 6.4 | 5 | -5 |
Belgium | 6.9 | 5 | -5 |
Estonia | 7.7 | 5 | -5 |
Czechia | 11 | 5 | -5 |
Get the data: Eurostat database
Figure 2.7 shows the EU-28 three year percentage changes in REER values for 2018. Ireland has the 8th lowest percentage change in REER value, with the United Kingdom and Czechia experiencing the lowest and highest changes, respectively.
Export Market Share (5 yr % change) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 1.85 | -6 |
2010 | -6.27 | -6 |
2011 | -10.29 | -6 |
2012 | -18.34 | -6 |
2013 | -10.57 | -6 |
2014 | -14.64 | -6 |
2015 | 37.84 | -6 |
2016 | 58.59 | -6 |
2017 | 71.33 | -6 |
2018 | 77.37 | -6 |
Source publication: International Accounts Q2 2019
Get the data: Eurostat database
The export market share is calculated by dividing the exports of the country by the total exports of the world. For a country to increase its export market share its exports must increase at a faster rate than world exports. As a result a country’s exports may increase but its export market share may still fall. To capture the structural losses in competitiveness that can accumulate over longer time periods, this indicator is calculated as the percentage change in values compared to five years previously.
Ireland experienced a negative export market share (taken as a five year percentage change), and breached the MIP threshold, each year from 2010 to 2014. This equates to a decrease in Ireland's export market share relative to total world exports. This trend changed in 2015, when the indicator value rose to 37.8%. The change largely relates to the amount of contract manufacturing carried out on behalf of Irish companies. The rise in contract manufacturing has led to the increase in goods exports from Irish companies, and is explained in the Contract Manufacturing Information Notice (PDF 516KB) published by the CSO. The export market share indicator continued to rise between 2015 and 2018, and stood at 77.4% in 2018.
Supplementary analysis:
Export Market Share (5 yr % change) | MIP Threshold | |
Sweden | -6.32 | -6 |
United Kingdom | -3.75 | -6 |
Finland | -3 | -6 |
Denmark | -1.5 | -6 |
Belgium | -1.46 | -6 |
France | -0.16 | -6 |
Italy | 0.27 | -6 |
Estonia | 0.75 | -6 |
Netherlands | 1.68 | -6 |
Germany | 3.11 | -6 |
Slovakia | 3.2 | -6 |
Lithuania | 3.49 | -6 |
Austria | 3.92 | -6 |
Spain | 4.61 | -6 |
Greece | 6.85 | -6 |
Hungary | 8.44 | -6 |
Latvia | 8.63 | -6 |
Portugal | 9.41 | -6 |
Luxembourg | 10.68 | -6 |
Czechia | 11.9 | -6 |
Bulgaria | 13.38 | -6 |
Cyprus | 16.57 | -6 |
Slovenia | 20.41 | -6 |
Croatia | 22.94 | -6 |
Romania | 23.72 | -6 |
Malta | 23.97 | -6 |
Poland | 25.75 | -6 |
Ireland | 77.37 | -6 |
Get the data: Eurostat database
Ireland had the highest increase in export market share in the EU in 2018, at 77.4%. As this indicator is calculated as a five year percentage change, this figure continues to reflect the large year on year increase of 40.6% seen in 2015.
Ireland | China | Germany | Netherlands | United Kingdom | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 1.85 | 48.4521650536475 | -6.83 | -5.39 | -19.79 | -6 |
2010 | -6.27 | 42.5211954166577 | -8.11 | -8.15 | -23.9 | -6 |
2011 | -10.29 | 34.6001431371978 | -9.35 | -8.35 | -25.92 | -6 |
2012 | -18.34 | 31.7390464904745 | -16.75 | -12.82 | -21.25 | -6 |
2013 | -10.57 | 33.3594781669528 | -12.99 | -11.34 | -11.62 | -6 |
2014 | -14.64 | 31.1245290539077 | -9.53 | -11.35 | -9.19 | -6 |
2015 | 37.84 | 30.5136948611807 | -3.18 | -6.74 | 2.71 | -6 |
2016 | 58.59 | 17.8620652179778 | 2 | -2.96 | 1.09 | -6 |
2017 | 71.33 | 10.9938649959728 | 5.73 | 1.52 | -1.18 | -6 |
2018 | 77.37 | 5.56845319718802 | 3.11 | 1.68 | -3.75 | -6 |
Get the data: Eurostat database, World Bank database
Figure 2.10 shows Ireland’s change in export market share relative to three of its largest EU trading partners and China. From 2010-2014 Ireland and the other EU countries show an export market share below the MIP threshold. Conversely, China’s change in export market share is relatively high from 2009-2015, declining significantly after 2015 to stand at 5.6% in 2018. Note that the country comparison data is sourced from Eurostat, with the exception of the data for China which is from the World Development Indicators compiled by the World Bank.
Nominal Unit Labour Cost (3 yr % change) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 8.7 | 9 |
2010 | -4.8 | 9 |
2011 | -13.7 | 9 |
2012 | -9.9 | 9 |
2013 | -0.7 | 9 |
2014 | -3.7 | 9 |
2015 | -18.6 | 9 |
2016 | -17.7 | 9 |
2017 | -15.4 | 9 |
2018 | -2.8 | 9 |
Source publication: National Income & Expenditure Annual, 2018
Get the data: StatBank N1802 (Employee Compensation/Total Labour Costs), StatBank QLF17 (Number of Employees), StatBank N1804 (Gross Domestic Product)
The nominal unit labour cost is an index computed using the ratio of labour costs (compensation per employee) to labour productivity (GDP per person employed, including self-employed).
A rise in an economy’s nominal unit labour cost corresponds to an increase in labour costs relative to labour productivity, resulting in lower competitiveness. The Macroeconomic Scoreboard indicator is presented as a three year percentage change.
In 2009, Ireland’s three year percentage change in nominal unit labour costs stood at 8.7%, just below the MIP threshold of 9%. However in 2010, due to the impact of the financial crisis, nominal unit labour costs decreased, leading to increased competitiveness in the Irish economy. In 2018, the three year change in Ireland’s nominal unit labour cost indicator was -2.8%. Note that values of this indicator in 2015-2017 were substantially affected by the level-shift in GDP in 2015.
Supplementary analysis:
Nominal Unit Labour Cost (3 yr % change) | Labour Productivity (3 yr % change) | Labour Cost (3 yr % change) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 8.7 | 0.947483846899702 | 9.40462346180072 | 9 |
2010 | -4.8 | 6.48805147567343 | 1.82914540002249 | 9 |
2011 | -13.7 | 12.9158416030485 | -2.11400386448231 | 9 |
2012 | -9.9 | 9.72461670831561 | -1.31012145748989 | 9 |
2013 | -0.7 | 1.28753018913612 | 0.55590589065671 | 9 |
2014 | -3.7 | 4.71090627524263 | 0.915013093252593 | 9 |
2015 | -18.6 | 25.867973570845 | 2.4354391722086 | 9 |
2016 | -17.7 | 28.021242383014 | 5.08557851512208 | 9 |
2017 | -15.4 | 27.2000410953298 | 7.01827620289611 | 9 |
2018 | -2.8 | 10.5275549641502 | 6.90498106666045 | 9 |
Get the data: Eurostat (Compensation of Employees), StatBank N1802 (Employee Compensation/Total Labour Costs), StatBank ESQ05 (Number of Employees), StatBank N1804 (Gross Domestic Product)
Breaking nominal unit labour cost into its two components shows the interrelationship between labour costs and productivity. In 2009, labour costs rose at a faster rate than labour productivity compared to their respective levels three years previously (Figure 2.12). This caused overall increases in nominal unit labour costs. Since 2010 the three year changes in labour costs were continually lower than those in labour productivity. From 2015 onwards, labour productivity increased at a significantly faster rate than labour costs thereby increasing overall economic competitiveness. Labour productivity increases since 2015 were mainly due to the large increase in GDP in 2015.
Deflated House Price Index (annual % change) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | -13.7 | 6 |
2010 | -11.6 | 6 |
2011 | -17.9 | 6 |
2012 | -14.6 | 6 |
2013 | -0.1 | 6 |
2014 | 15.5 | 6 |
2015 | 10.8 | 6 |
2016 | 7.1 | 6 |
2017 | 9.8 | 6 |
2018 | 8.3 | 6 |
Source publication: Residential Property Price Index, August 2019
Get the data: StatBank HPA06 (Residential Property Price Index), StatBank N1805 (Consumption at Current Market Prices by Item and Year), StatBank N1806 (Consumption at Constant Market Prices by Item and Year)
The deflated house price index is the ratio between the residential property price index and the national accounts deflator for private final consumption expenditure for households. This year-on-year percentage change indicator measures inflation in the housing market relative to inflation in the final consumption expenditure of households. The national accounts deflator for private final consumption expenditure is obtained by dividing final consumption expenditure of households at current market prices (79a) by final consumption expenditure of households at constant market prices (92a). The deflated house price index is then calculated by dividing the house price index by this deflator.
From 2009 to 2013, Ireland experienced decreases in the deflated house price index (Figure 2.13), following the financial crisis. Since 2014, Ireland has seen increases in the deflated house price index and has consistently breached the MIP threshold of 6%. These increases suggest inflation of the Irish housing market relative to the final consumption of households. In 2018, the annual percentage change in the deflated price index was 8.3%, down 1.5% from the 2017 value of 9.8%.
Deflated House Price Index (annual % change) | Excluding Dublin | Dublin | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | -13.6 | -10.9 | -19.3 | 6 |
2010 | -11.6 | -10 | -15.2 | 6 |
2011 | -17.9 | -18.6 | -16.9 | 6 |
2012 | -14.5 | -16.3 | -12.8 | 6 |
2013 | -0.2 | -8.1 | 8.4 | 6 |
2014 | 15.4 | 6.8 | 22.9 | 6 |
2015 | 10.9 | 12.5 | 9.4 | 6 |
2016 | 7.1 | 9.6 | 4.8 | 6 |
2017 | 9.8 | 11 | 8.3 | 6 |
2018 | 8.3 | 10.1 | 6.7 | 6 |
Get the data: StatBank HPA06 (Residential Property Price Index), StatBank N1805 (Consumption at Current Market Prices by Item and Year), StatBank N1806 (Consumption at Constant Market Prices by Item and Year)
Figure 2.14 shows a comparison of the year-on-year deflated house price index between Dublin and the rest of the country. In 2009 and 2010, Dublin experienced a greater rate of house price index deflation compared to the rest of the country. Similarly, as house prices began to recover from the great recession, in 2013 and 2014 the rate of house price index inflation was faster for Dublin than the rest of the country. From 2015 onwards both prices of property within and outside Dublin increased, however, the prices outside Dublin increased at a faster rate than prices in Dublin.
Private Sector Credit Flow (% GDP) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | -4.54612339360536 | 14 |
2010 | 2.22327851223022 | 14 |
2011 | 16.4537969040693 | 14 |
2012 | -0.500504924767557 | 14 |
2013 | -1.37046920180122 | 14 |
2014 | 2.55275834654737 | 14 |
2015 | -2.33584685771008 | 14 |
2016 | -15.7164178208365 | 14 |
2017 | 0.170611561179274 | 14 |
2018 | -7.75873291846794 | 14 |
Source publication: Institutional Sector Accounts Non-Financial and Financial 2018
Get the data: StatBank IFI04
Private sector credit flow represents the net amount of liabilities (loans and debt securities) which non-financial corporations (NFCs, S.11), households (S.14) and non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH, S.15) have incurred during the year. Transactions between units within each sector are eliminated to produce a consolidated presentation. The indicator is expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Figure 2.15 shows that, aside from 2011, the indicator has been below the MIP threshold since 2009. The threshold breach in 2011 was caused principally by refinancing operations of large multinational groups during this period. In 2018, private sector credit flows decreased by €25.6bn over the 2017 level, standing at -7.8% of GDP – well below the MIP threshold of 14%.
Supplementary analysis:
Non Financial Corporations | Households | Total | |
2009 | -5.71931608503375 | -2.01366476523815 | -7.7329808502719 |
2010 | 13.5475085213224 | -9.8183523861205 | 3.72915613520191 |
2011 | 36.9587721037702 | -8.85124592294578 | 28.1075261808244 |
2012 | 6.44057482644405 | -7.317037322579 | -0.876462496134952 |
2013 | 2.100474776747 | -4.56267696487747 | -2.46220218813047 |
2014 | 10.5530736457343 | -5.57983567253661 | 4.97323797319773 |
2015 | -1.61993020239336 | -4.51945593038586 | -6.13938613277921 |
2016 | -39.9761057444093 | -2.72282680172762 | -42.6989325461369 |
2017 | 1.44886989474456 | -0.941930334344126 | 0.506939560400433 |
2018 | -26.3223186388595 | 1.18106099091937 | -25.1412576479402 |
A breakdown of private sector credit flow shows flows in non-financial corporation liabilities to generally be much greater than flows in household liabilities from 2009 onwards (Figure 2.16, Table 2.4). There was a sharp increase in flows of corporate liabilities in 2011, reflecting broad activity in the multinational sector. In 2016 and 2018, the large negative credit flow values of -€40bn and -€26.3bn, respectively, were mainly caused by net repayment of non-financial corporate debt related to the funding of intellectual property.
A positive credit flow equates to a net incurrence of debt during the year whereas a negative sign indicates a net repayment of debt during the same accounting period. The negative credit flows occurring in the household sector from 2009-2017, cumulatively amounting to €46.3bn, correspond to a net repayment, primarily of mortgage related debt. In 2018, there was a value of €1.2bn for household private sector credit flow.
Private Sector Debt (% if GDP) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 256.088214876223 | 133 |
2010 | 257.012176888144 | 133 |
2011 | 274.456732570027 | 133 |
2012 | 279.105095361928 | 133 |
2013 | 267.481218386938 | 133 |
2014 | 278.357570164634 | 133 |
2015 | 305.086279626025 | 133 |
2016 | 284.446083954244 | 133 |
2017 | 250.535349699934 | 133 |
2018 | 223.237499641301 | 133 |
Source publication: Institutional Sector Accounts Non-Financial and Financial 2018
Get the data: StatBank IFI05
Private sector debt is the stock of liabilities in the form of loans and debt securities held by non-financial corporations (NFCs, S.11), households (S.14) and non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH, S.15). Positions between units within each sector are eliminated to produce a consolidated presentation. This reflects the amount of funds that the sector receives from other sectors. The indicator is expressed as a percentage of GDP (Figure 2.17). For Ireland, this indicator has exceeded the threshold of 133% every year since 2001 (the first year of availability for this time series) and stood at 223.2% of GDP at the end of 2018.
Supplementary analysis:
NFCs (Foreign Parent) | NFCs (Irish Parent) | Households | Total Private Sector Debt | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 68.3380227041581 | 71.5198617292079 | 116.229651676614 | 256.087536109981 | 133 |
2010 | 86.7041292061145 | 60.0839434335726 | 110.224560342906 | 257.012632982594 | 133 |
2011 | 102.824191140745 | 66.9437501097602 | 104.688776897358 | 274.456718147863 | 133 |
2012 | 110.956432638442 | 69.6513271899745 | 98.4970664730479 | 279.104826301464 | 133 |
2013 | 96.2708270238494 | 77.9968469130854 | 93.2139117338014 | 267.481585670736 | 133 |
2014 | 110.89412519587 | 86.4182666484246 | 81.0453129744317 | 278.357704818727 | 133 |
2015 | 166.053985125283 | 82.5249672774291 | 56.5077692832179 | 305.08672168593 | 133 |
2016 | 140.650023028972 | 91.7330721529024 | 52.0722747145332 | 284.455369896408 | 133 |
2017 | 118.031801294087 | 85.7015165065323 | 46.8019521696115 | 250.535269970231 | 133 |
2018 | 119.811305095143 | 61.7196697721595 | 41.7068377619315 | 223.237812629234 | 133 |
The analysis shown in Figure 2.18 and Table 2.5 considers the residency of an NFC’s ultimate controlling parent as the basis for distinguishing between Irish-controlled and foreign-controlled enterprises. In the period since 2009, several large multinational corporations have relocated their head offices to Ireland (i.e. redomiciled PLCs/corporate inversions), becoming an Irish parent NFC in this analysis.
During the period following the financial crisis (circa. 2009-2012), the contribution to overall private sector debt by Irish entities (NFCs and households) decreased, while the contribution from foreign-owned NFCs steadily increased. From 2013 to 2018, household debt (as a percentage of GDP) continued to fall. Total private sector debt increased in 2014 and 2015 due to notable increases in foreign-parent NFC debt, with a reversal in this trend in 2016 and 2017. In 2017, for the first time since the economic crisis, the combined debt of Irish parent non-financial corporations and households fell below the MIP threshold. In 2018, debt of Irish parent NFCs and households decreased again, to 61.7% of GDP and 41.7% of GDP respectively.
Redomiciled PLCs | Foreign Parent (ROW Debt) | Irish Parent (ROW Debt) | Foreign Parent (Irish Debt) | Irish Parent (Irish Debt) | Households | MIP Threshold | |
2012 | 8.61335681491126 | 69.1796179563919 | 11.5429983066279 | 41.7768146820503 | 49.4949720684353 | 98.4970664730479 | 133 |
2013 | 12.974918556615 | 66.5203411713844 | 14.8349552485063 | 29.7504858524651 | 50.1869731079642 | 93.2139117338014 | 133 |
2014 | 25.4586501940272 | 77.6438116971184 | 17.8439633702892 | 33.2503134987519 | 43.1156530841082 | 81.0453129744317 | 133 |
2015 | 28.1719635856228 | 146.643626864674 | 15.9458410799343 | 19.4103582606096 | 38.407162611872 | 56.5077692832179 | 133 |
2016 | 31.7369826169373 | 126.216539150096 | 26.1411990813196 | 14.4334838788758 | 33.8548904546455 | 52.0722747145332 | 133 |
2017 | 24.7700925719632 | 100.376455272179 | 31.4805310507786 | 17.6553460219083 | 29.4508928837905 | 46.8019521696115 | 133 |
2018 | 25.7563061875459 | 106.229884986902 | 11.1967911562018 | 13.581420108241 | 24.7665724284118 | 41.7068377619315 | 133 |
Figure 2.19 shows a breakdown of private sector debt by location of counterparty – i.e. whether the debt is held with an entity resident in Ireland (Irish Debt) or outside of Ireland (ROW Debt). This analysis exploits newly available classifications from the BPM6 methodology. The debt of redomiciled PLCs is shown separately from the other non-financial corporations.
Prior to 2017, entities with an Irish parent predominantly borrow from Irish counterparties, whilst entities with foreign parents are mostly indebted to non-resident counterparties. In 2015, there was a large increase in foreign parent NFC non-resident (ROW) debt. This was related to corporate restructuring, both for imports of individual assets and for reclassifications of entire balance sheets in 2015. As a percentage of GDP, 2018 saw a reduction in private sector debt across most counterparty groups, except for foreign parent NFC non-resident (ROW) debt and redomiciled PLCs.
General Government Debt (% GDP) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 61.5434359586363 | 60 |
2010 | 85.9883623876183 | 60 |
2011 | 111.063824805212 | 60 |
2012 | 119.941067635168 | 60 |
2013 | 119.865747157146 | 60 |
2014 | 104.393844511287 | 60 |
2015 | 76.7232425152093 | 60 |
2016 | 73.8758999425803 | 60 |
2017 | 67.7690984784489 | 60 |
2018 | 63.5660015183404 | 60 |
Source publication: Government Finance Statistics Annual, October 2019
Get the data: StatBank GFQ13 (Government Debt), StatBank N1824 (GDP)
General government gross debt (GG debt) consists of liabilities in the financial instruments of currency and deposits (AF.2), debt securities (AF.3) and loans (AF.4). The scoreboard indicator is obtained by expressing GG Debt as a percentage of GDP.
GG debt as a percentage of GDP grew steadily from 2009 to its peak in 2012/2013 of 119.9% and breached the MIP threshold of 60% in each of the past 10 years. GG Debt as a percentage of GDP has been decreasing since 2013, with significant reductions seen in 2014 and 2015 due to the repayment of IMF loans in 2014 and a substantial increase in GDP in 2015. The rate of decrease seen between 2015 and 2018 has been more gradual. In 2018, GG debt as a percentage of GDP decreased by 3.2%, from 67.8% to 63.6%.
The level of GG Debt since 2009 has been strongly influenced by the financial crisis, the most significant factor being the state interventions in the banking sector from 2009 onwards. For more see file: Ireland - Impact of Government Support for Financial Institutions October 2019 (XLS 18KB) (Source: CSO, Excel file 18KB).
Supplementary analysis:
General Government Debt (% GDP) | General Government Debt (% GNI*) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 61.5434359586363 | 77.6366238755275 | 60 |
2010 | 85.9883623876183 | 111.8408808933 | 60 |
2011 | 111.063824805212 | 150.150366419222 | 60 |
2012 | 119.941067635168 | 166.038988758716 | 60 |
2013 | 119.865747157146 | 157.23829759271 | 60 |
2014 | 104.393844511287 | 136.73573666447 | 60 |
2015 | 76.7232425152093 | 123.975752508361 | 60 |
2016 | 73.8758999425803 | 114.278800439558 | 60 |
2017 | 67.7690984784489 | 109.463183930853 | 60 |
2018 | 63.5660015183404 | 104.313785070394 | 60 |
Figure 2.21 shows GG debt both as a percentage of GDP, and as a percentage of GNI* (modified GNI excluding globalisation effects). The differential between government debt as a percentage of GDP and that as a percentage of GNI* widens proportionally as government debt increases up to 2012 and reduces proportionally between 2012 and 2014 as government debt decreases. In 2015 there is a significant change in the differential, which is a result of the substantial jump in GDP of approximately 35%. The difference between government debt as a percentage of GDP and government debt as a percentage of GNI* stood at 47% in 2015. The value of government debt decreased by less than 1% in 2015, while GDP and GNI* increased by 35% and 9% respectively. Again, between 2015 and 2018, the reduction in government debt as a percentage of GDP/GNI* is a result of increases in the values of GDP and GNI*, with values of government debt decreasing by less than 0.5% in 2016 and increasing in both 2017 and 2018. For further information on GNI* and its calculation see the National Income and Expenditure Annual Results 2018.
Deposits | Debt Securities | Loans | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 6.06013797097126 | 53.8122149979982 | 1.67081354192694 | 60 |
2010 | 8.1744614630482 | 57.461247424674 | 20.3525882764297 | 60 |
2011 | 34.1796661498468 | 55.0443110487083 | 21.8397077744498 | 60 |
2012 | 35.4616675621531 | 49.8677147144122 | 34.611868391182 | 60 |
2013 | 17.4528692737211 | 62.7097529667699 | 39.7031345418991 | 60 |
2014 | 10.7371333751407 | 61.1227055072273 | 32.5339997288432 | 60 |
2015 | 7.88074695895492 | 47.8502837062965 | 20.9922503393673 | 60 |
2016 | 7.84551773743495 | 45.5973003710277 | 20.4329033241477 | 60 |
2017 | 7.26945702415433 | 43.7924136994197 | 16.7072437860509 | 60 |
2018 | 6.68064540250336 | 41.4250716221385 | 15.4601477906589 | 60 |
Source publication: Government Finance Statistics Annual, October 2019
Get the data: StatBank GFQ13 (Government Debt), StatBank N1824 (GDP)
Figure 2.22 shows a breakdown of general government debt, as a percentage of GDP, into its constituent debt instruments. The significant increase in loan liabilities during the years 2010-2013 is predominantly a result of the EU-IMF programme of financial support. Deposits saw the largest amount of growth in 2011. This is mainly due to a combination of the reclassification of Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC) into the government sector from mid-2011 and the growing participation of the household sector in state savings schemes since 2009. The decline in the size of the currency and deposits sector once again in the period from 2013 to 2015 is related to the liquidation of IBRC. Between 2015 and 2018, all debt instruments experienced a decrease as a percentage of GDP which was consistent with the reduction in general government debt.
GG Debt (% GDP) | MIP Threshold | |
Estonia | 8.4 | 60 |
Luxembourg | 21 | 60 |
Bulgaria | 22.3 | 60 |
Czechia | 32.6 | 60 |
Lithuania | 34.1 | 60 |
Denmark | 34.2 | 60 |
Romania | 35 | 60 |
Latvia | 36.4 | 60 |
Sweden | 38.8 | 60 |
Malta | 45.8 | 60 |
Poland | 48.9 | 60 |
Slovakia | 49.4 | 60 |
Netherlands | 52.4 | 60 |
Finland | 59 | 60 |
Germany | 61.9 | 60 |
Ireland (% GDP) | 63.6 | 60 |
Hungary | 70.2 | 60 |
Slovenia | 70.4 | 60 |
Austria | 74 | 60 |
Croatia | 74.8 | 60 |
United Kingdom | 85.9 | 60 |
Spain | 97.6 | 60 |
France | 98.4 | 60 |
Belgium | 100 | 60 |
Cyprus | 100.6 | 60 |
Ireland (% GNI*) | 104.3 | 60 |
Portugal | 122.2 | 60 |
Italy | 134.8 | 60 |
Greece | 181.2 | 60 |
Source Publication: National Income and Expenditure Annual Results 2018
Get the data: StatBank N1824 (GDP), StatBank GFQ13 (Government Debt), Eurostat database
Ireland’s general government gross debt as a percentage of GDP (63.6%) was the 13th highest in the EU in 2018. Ireland's GG Debt as a percentage of GNI* (modified GNI excluding globalisation effects) was 104.3%. If GNI* for Ireland is comparable to GDP for other countries which are less significantly affected by globalisation, then Ireland had the fourth highest level of government debt as a ratio of economic activity in the EU in 2018. For further information on GNI* and its calculation see the National Income and Expenditure Annual Results 2018.
Unemployment Rate (3 yr avg) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 8.15 | 10 |
2010 | 11.3333333333333 | 10 |
2011 | 14.2 | 10 |
2012 | 15.1583333333333 | 10 |
2013 | 14.9 | 10 |
2014 | 13.75 | 10 |
2015 | 11.9 | 10 |
2016 | 10.1083333333333 | 10 |
2017 | 8.38333333333333 | 10 |
2018 | 6.98333333333333 | 10 |
Source publication: Labour Force Survey Q2 2019
Get the data: StatBank QLF01
The unemployment rate is the percentage of people in the labour force who are unemployed. The indicator is derived as a three-year average based on the reference year plus the previous two years.
This indicator exceeded the MIP threshold from 2010 to 2016 (Figure 2.24). Unemployment has exhibited a downward trend since 2013 and is below the threshold in both 2017 and 2018, for the first time since 2009.
Supplementary analysis:
Unemployed 15-24 years (% of labour force, 3 yr avg) | Unemployed 25+ years (% of labour force, 3 yr avg) | Unemployment Rate (3 yr avg) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 2.79973596645655 | 5.32111481388147 | 8.15 | 10 |
2010 | 3.56617959169688 | 7.73928626276385 | 11.3333333333333 | 10 |
2011 | 4.04867695150506 | 10.1173559642813 | 14.2 | 10 |
2012 | 3.99739481221742 | 11.1149975836728 | 15.1583333333333 | 10 |
2013 | 3.74696843522762 | 11.0989908826059 | 14.9 | 10 |
2014 | 3.37541726791522 | 10.3050476548722 | 13.75 | 10 |
2015 | 2.8623932053447 | 8.97025372812347 | 11.9 | 10 |
2016 | 2.4461767529491 | 7.59960725397191 | 10.1083333333333 | 10 |
2017 | 2.06304901670361 | 6.26761497002373 | 8.38333333333333 | 10 |
2018 | 1.80305705332988 | 5.13943877616243 | 6.98333333333333 | 10 |
Get the data: StatBank QLF04
Figure 2.25 shows a breakdown of the unemployment rate by age group, illustrating the share of the unemployment rate composed of those younger than 25 years of age and those 25 years and over. From 2009 to 2011, unemployment increased both for those aged 15-24 and those aged over 25 (Figure 2.25). In 2018, unemployment has decreased for both age groups, as it has done since 2013. For further information on the unemployment rates for different age groups, please see the Labour Force Survey results, and the associated StatBank tables. Further information on youth unemployment can also be found in Indicator 14 below.
Industry | Construction | Wholesale & Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles | All Other Services + Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing | Not Stated/Not Applicable | Unemployment Rate (3 yr avg) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 0.880886930557696 | 1.77497500202273 | 0.857412586287453 | 2.2017759404909 | 2.40721346890756 | 8.15 | 10 |
2010 | 1.22622075863857 | 2.72557184377203 | 1.23240367398413 | 3.08624823802707 | 3.03643448796725 | 11.3333333333333 | 10 |
2011 | 1.50861118803126 | 3.35646918209987 | 1.5785663130419 | 3.96467233802334 | 3.75771389459003 | 14.2 | 10 |
2012 | 1.55473268784242 | 3.29912660180026 | 1.75383874135689 | 4.44238130228641 | 4.06268774599677 | 15.1583333333333 | 10 |
2013 | 1.465414105159 | 2.86783970858404 | 1.73398614975229 | 4.57035404688006 | 4.20873999085067 | 14.9 | 10 |
2014 | 1.32006976853535 | 2.28375029817288 | 1.59459315152624 | 4.45515729693148 | 4.02726909101397 | 13.75 | 10 |
2015 | 1.08841697721554 | 1.66231128032865 | 1.3025303286585 | 3.93513048243964 | 3.84425786482583 | 11.9 | 10 |
2016 | 0.87191653264966 | 1.15872157830366 | 1.02523104345132 | 3.35390456961939 | 3.63601028289699 | 10.1083333333333 | 10 |
2017 | 0.680966777347275 | 0.820612371382361 | 0.823722134180321 | 2.78018888852055 | 3.22552812368685 | 8.38333333333333 | 10 |
2018 | 0.527881969044216 | 0.526064595726827 | 0.688364410621858 | 2.40193211217316 | 2.7965193894359 | 6.98333333333333 | 10 |
Figure 2.26 shows a breakdown of the unemployment rate by previous sector of employment, illustrating the share of the unemployment rate composed of each sector. The not stated/not applicable category in this figure includes persons who have never worked previously, and those who have worked previously but not during the past eight years. In 2018, unemployment continued to reduce across all sectors.
Total Financial Sector Liabilities (annual % change) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 3.36040588186049 | 16.5 |
2010 | 6.33653410680594 | 16.5 |
2011 | -2.28278229151341 | 16.5 |
2012 | -1.79388051756486 | 16.5 |
2013 | 1.94773932069684 | 16.5 |
2014 | 19.5480411929891 | 16.5 |
2015 | 9.63478971544564 | 16.5 |
2016 | 1.51322026354729 | 16.5 |
2017 | 4.25607282024232 | 16.5 |
2018 | 5.10944655342617 | 16.5 |
Source publication: Institutional Sector Accounts Non-Financial and Financial 2018
Get the data: StatBank IFI03
This indicator measures the year-on-year change in the sum of all liabilities of the financial sector. This indicator only breached the MIP threshold of 16.5% in the year 2014 (Figure 2.27). The sharp increase in financial sector liabilities in 2014 was driven mainly by growth in the investment funds sector (S.124).
It should be noted that the generally positive year-on-year growth in total financial sector liabilities over the period 2009-2018 has been heavily influenced by the expansion of the investment funds sector in Ireland. While there was a contraction in this indicator in the period 2011 to 2012, the investment funds sector has expanded every year since 2008, as can be seen in Figure 2.28. For more information on the financial sector see The Financial Sector in Ireland's National Accounts 2016.
Supplementary analysis:
Central Bank | Banks and Money Market Funds | Investment Funds | Other Financial Corporations | Total Financial Sector | |
2009 | 8.187 | -117.362 | 109.4768964 | 112.569570186166 | 112.871466586167 |
2010 | 79.122 | -127.316 | 186.212992 | 81.9687159091544 | 219.987707909154 |
2011 | -28.15 | -266.049788753134 | 173.074345 | 36.8514387230189 | -84.2740050301156 |
2012 | -38.537 | -149.020185593866 | 199.627479115882 | -76.7836230444617 | -64.7133295224449 |
2013 | -32.837 | -92.860825653 | 162.462267025444 | 32.2388194458733 | 69.0032608183171 |
2014 | -23.1677632110422 | 75.7750680872714 | 453.568690549474 | 199.848270194261 | 706.024265619964 |
2015 | -3.04001143301284 | -28.7275979925522 | 165.44822688065 | 282.326812385027 | 416.007429840112 |
2016 | 4.76406303865305 | 24.9376680294515 | 119.28956238761 | -77.3589131115227 | 71.6323803441925 |
2017 | 6.21029669310999 | -20.8169178923818 | 281.51422811499 | -62.3861444044097 | 204.521462511308 |
2018 | 2.55619447234801 | 67.0795189444802 | 92.1050562591692 | 94.2386569391259 | 255.979426615124 |
The investment funds sector has shown continuous growth in balance sheet size since 2009. Figure 2.28 shows the effect of this growth on the financial sector in helping to offset the deleveraging which occurred in the banking sector from 2009 to 2013. The banking sector showed year-on-year growth in its balance sheet during 2014, for the first time since 2008. Since 2014, the banking sector liabilities have fluctuated between contracting and expanding, with small overall changes in size relative to previous years.
It should be noted that part of the large increase in liabilities of the other financial corporations sector shown in 2014 and 2015 is a result of a newly available data source for this period. Another driver of this change is the growth in balance sheet size of treasury companies. More detail is provided in the CSO’s note on Measuring Shadow Banking in the Irish National Accounts.
Activity Rate (3 yr p.p. change) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | -1.9 | -0.2 |
2010 | -4 | -0.2 |
2011 | -3.6 | -0.2 |
2012 | -1.9 | -0.2 |
2013 | 0.2 | -0.2 |
2014 | 0.6 | -0.2 |
2015 | 1 | -0.2 |
2016 | 0.9 | -0.2 |
2017 | 0.9 | -0.2 |
2018 | 0.8 | -0.2 |
Get the Data: Eurostat database
The activity rate (also known as the participation rate) is the percentage of the population aged 15-64 years in the labour force as a proportion of the total population of the same age. This particular indicator is measured as a three-year percentage point change. This indicator breached its threshold of -0.2% in the years 2009-2012. Since 2013, the three year percentage point change in the activity rate has become positive, with a value of 0.8% in 2018.
Ireland | Germany | Greece | Netherlands | United Kingdom | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | -1.9 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 2.7 | 0 | -0.2 |
2010 | -4 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.2 | -0.1 | -0.2 |
2011 | -3.6 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 0.3 | -0.3 | -0.2 |
2012 | -1.9 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 0.4 | -0.2 |
2013 | 0.2 | 0.9 | -0.3 | 1.5 | 1 | -0.2 |
2014 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 1.2 | -0.2 |
2015 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.8 | -0.2 |
2016 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.9 | -0.2 |
2017 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.9 | -0.2 |
2018 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 1 | -0.2 |
Get the data: Eurostat database
Figure 2.30 shows the change in Ireland’s activity rate compared with selected EU countries. From 2009 to 2012, the change in Ireland’s activity rate breached the MIP threshold. The Netherlands follows a similar trend to that of Ireland, but with changes of lesser magnitude. While Germany did not breach the MIP threshold at any time during the ten year period, our three other European counterparts all breached the threshold at some point between 2010 and 2013.
15-19 yrs | 20-24 yrs | 25-34 yrs | 35-44 yrs | 45-54 yrs | 55-64 yrs | Total | |
2009 | -36.675 | -15.975 | 25.7499999999999 | 38.9999999999999 | 30.875 | 21 | 63.9749999999998 |
2010 | -58.65 | -73.55 | -17.75 | 21.925 | 22.8249999999999 | 17.575 | -87.6250000000001 |
2011 | -51.8 | -88.45 | -37.925 | 18.5250000000001 | 16.175 | 13.775 | -129.7 |
2012 | -25.175 | -75.525 | -43.3499999999999 | 25.0500000000002 | 18.225 | 14 | -86.7749999999997 |
2013 | -7.125 | -39.675 | -47.8249999999999 | 35.975 | 22.8750000000001 | 22.65 | -13.1249999999999 |
2014 | -3.24999999999999 | -21.375 | -50.45 | 41.175 | 25.625 | 25.375 | 17.0999999999999 |
2015 | -3.925 | -9.44999999999999 | -51.9250000000001 | 39.5999999999999 | 33.575 | 38.325 | 46.1999999999998 |
2016 | 10.025 | -0.275000000000006 | -40.325 | 37.475 | 26.55 | 34.2 | 67.6499999999999 |
2017 | 6.92499999999998 | -5.17500000000004 | -34.5999999999999 | 40.6999999999999 | 35.5249999999999 | 39.2 | 82.5749999999999 |
2018 | 8.84999999999999 | 2.59999999999999 | -27.3249999999999 | 41.525 | 33.8 | 37.275 | 96.725 |
Figure 2.31 shows the change over three years in the labour force by age group. The decline in the activity rate from 2010 onwards was mainly due to people aged 15 to 34 leaving the labour force.
Ireland | Germany | Greece | Netherlands | Spain | United Kingdom | |
2009 | 73 | 76.3 | 67.4 | 78.1 | 73.1 | 75.7 |
2010 | 71.6 | 76.7 | 67.8 | 77.9 | 73.5 | 75.4 |
2011 | 71.2 | 77.3 | 67.3 | 78.1 | 73.9 | 75.5 |
2012 | 71.1 | 77.2 | 67.5 | 79 | 74.3 | 76.1 |
2013 | 71.8 | 77.6 | 67.5 | 79.4 | 74.3 | 76.4 |
2014 | 71.8 | 77.7 | 67.4 | 79 | 74.2 | 76.7 |
2015 | 72.1 | 77.6 | 67.8 | 79.6 | 74.3 | 76.9 |
2016 | 72.7 | 77.9 | 68.2 | 79.7 | 74.2 | 77.3 |
2017 | 72.7 | 78.2 | 68.3 | 79.7 | 73.9 | 77.6 |
2018 | 72.9 | 78.6 | 68.2 | 80.3 | 73.7 | 77.9 |
Get the data: Eurostat database
Compared to three of the country’s largest European trading partners (Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), Ireland has consistently had a relatively low activity rate.
Long-term Unemployment Rate (3 yr p.p. change) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 2.09741377395557 | 0.5 |
2010 | 5.46234273542255 | 0.5 |
2011 | 7.03028865740371 | 0.5 |
2012 | 5.63948595704592 | 0.5 |
2013 | 1.05988253220755 | 0.5 |
2014 | -2.19327120202977 | 0.5 |
2015 | -3.84795051426457 | 0.5 |
2016 | -3.69899911501379 | 0.5 |
2017 | -3.52258782350763 | 0.5 |
2018 | -3.22820816517914 | 0.5 |
Source publication: Labour Force Survey Q2 2019
Get the data: StatBank QLF04 (Duration of Unemployment), Eurostat database
The long-term unemployment rate expresses the number of people aged 15 to 74 unemployed for over one year as a percentage of the active population of the same age. The MIP threshold for the three year change in percentage points of the long-term unemployment rate is 0.5%. After small changes in the long-term unemployment rate (measured as a three-year percentage point change) in 2007 and 2008, Ireland’s long-term unemployment rate increased from 2009 to 2013 at rates far above the 0.5% threshold. However, since 2014, long-term unemployment as a three-year percentage point change has shown a decrease every year.
Supplementary analysis:
15-24 years | 25-44 years | 45 years and over | Total | |
2009 | 15.125 | 23.35 | 10.925 | 49.35 |
2010 | 28.675 | 63.675 | 29.525 | 121.875 |
2011 | 28.025 | 88.325 | 38.35 | 154.675 |
2012 | 17.25 | 67.75 | 37.525 | 122.55 |
2013 | -7.825 | 13.3 | 17.875 | 23.35 |
2014 | -15.925 | -33.125 | 1.775 | -47.275 |
2015 | -21.325 | -47.775 | -13.4 | -82.425 |
2016 | -13.825 | -46.375 | -19.475 | -79.675 |
2017 | -12.45 | -40.775 | -23.35 | -76.6 |
2018 | -11.075 | -36.975 | -23.275 | -71.4 |
Figure 2.34 and Table 2.10 show that the majority of those who were long-term unemployed from 2009 to 2012 (measured as a three-year change in absolute values) were aged 25-44 years. Similarly, this age category made the largest contribution to the decline in the numbers unemployed from 2014 to 2018.
Long-term Unemployment Rate | |
Czechia | 0.7 |
Poland | 1 |
Denmark | 1.1 |
Malta | 1.1 |
United Kingdom | 1.1 |
Sweden | 1.2 |
Estonia | 1.3 |
Germany | 1.4 |
Luxembourg | 1.4 |
Hungary | 1.4 |
Netherlands | 1.4 |
Austria | 1.4 |
Finland | 1.6 |
Romania | 1.8 |
Lithuania | 2 |
Ireland | 2.1 |
Slovenia | 2.2 |
Cyprus | 2.7 |
Belgium | 2.9 |
Bulgaria | 3 |
Latvia | 3.1 |
Portugal | 3.1 |
Croatia | 3.4 |
France | 3.8 |
Slovakia | 4 |
Italy | 6.2 |
Spain | 6.4 |
Greece | 13.6 |
Source publication: Labour Force Survey Q2 2019
Get the data: StatBank QLF04 (Duration of Unemployment), Eurostat database
In 2018, Ireland had the 13th highest long-term unemployment rate in the EU (Figure 2.35).
Ireland | Germany | Greece | France | Netherlands | Spain | United Kingdom | |
2009 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 3.3 | 1.1 | 4.3 | 1.9 |
2010 | 6.9 | 3.3 | 5.7 | 3.9 | 1.3 | 7.3 | 2.5 |
2011 | 8.8 | 2.8 | 8.8 | 4 | 1.6 | 8.9 | 2.7 |
2012 | 9.2 | 2.4 | 14.5 | 4.1 | 1.9 | 11 | 2.7 |
2013 | 8 | 2.3 | 18.5 | 4.4 | 2.5 | 13 | 2.7 |
2014 | 6.6 | 2.2 | 19.5 | 4.5 | 2.9 | 12.9 | 2.2 |
2015 | 5.3 | 2 | 18.2 | 4.6 | 3 | 11.4 | 1.6 |
2016 | 4.2 | 1.7 | 17 | 4.6 | 2.5 | 9.5 | 1.3 |
2017 | 3 | 1.6 | 15.6 | 4.2 | 1.9 | 7.7 | 1.1 |
2018 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 13.6 | 3.8 | 1.4 | 6.4 | 1.1 |
Source publication: Labour Force Survey Q2 2019
Get the data: StatBank QLF04 (Duration of Unemployment), Eurostat database
Since 2010, Ireland’s long-term unemployment rate has been higher than three of its major trading partners (Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) but this gap has narrowed in recent years.
Youth Unemployment Rate (3 yr p.p. change) | MIP Threshold | |
2009 | 15.7386559318584 | 2 |
2010 | 18.9772056928876 | 2 |
2011 | 16.1233622657923 | 2 |
2012 | 6.38715302618401 | 2 |
2013 | -1.40581173612977 | 2 |
2014 | -6.17126066696326 | 2 |
2015 | -10.6595911026164 | 2 |
2016 | -9.93257864971189 | 2 |
2017 | -9.016693580387 | 2 |
2018 | -6.47270780888725 | 2 |
Source publication: Labour Force Survey Q2 2019
Get the data: StatBank QLF18 (ILO Participation, Employment and Unemployment Characteristics by Age Group)
The youth unemployment rate is the unemployment rate of people aged 15-24 as a percentage of the labour force of the same age. This indicator is expressed as a three year change in percentage points. The MIP threshold for youth unemployment is a 2 percentage point increase over three years. Ireland’s youth unemployment increased at a rate exceeding this threshold between 2009 and 2012, peaking with an 19% increase in 2010. Substantial reduction in youth unemployment can be seen from 2013 onwards.
Supplementary analysis:
Unemployed Persons Aged 15-19 yrs | Unemployed Persons Aged 20-24 yrs | |
2009 | 14.175 | 41.9 |
2010 | 9.7 | 40.5 |
2011 | 4.75 | 24.325 |
2012 | -1.75 | -3.15 |
2013 | -3.35 | -13.775 |
2014 | -6.075 | -18.05 |
2015 | -11.55 | -23.1 |
2016 | -7.25 | -19.075 |
2017 | -6.15 | -18.2 |
2018 | -1.825 | -14.175 |
Get the data: StatBank QLF18
Classifying the change in youth unemployment by age, it can be seen that most of the change in youth unemployment is mainly driven by those aged from 20 to 24.
Youth Unemployment Rate | |
Germany | 6.2 |
Czechia | 6.7 |
Netherlands | 7.2 |
Slovenia | 8.8 |
Malta | 9.1 |
Austria | 9.4 |
Hungary | 10.2 |
Denmark | 10.5 |
Lithuania | 11.1 |
United Kingdom | 11.3 |
Poland | 11.7 |
Estonia | 11.9 |
Latvia | 12.2 |
Bulgaria | 12.7 |
Ireland | 13.8 |
Luxembourg | 14.1 |
Slovakia | 14.9 |
Belgium | 15.8 |
Romania | 16.2 |
Sweden | 16.8 |
Finland | 17 |
Cyprus | 20.2 |
Portugal | 20.3 |
France | 20.7 |
Croatia | 23.4 |
Italy | 32.2 |
Spain | 34.3 |
Greece | 39.9 |
Get the data: Eurostat database
Figure 2.39 shows Ireland’s youth unemployment rate compared to its EU neighbours for 2018. Ireland's youth unemployment rate sits mid-table, 14th highest, in 2018.
Ireland | Germany | Greece | Netherlands | Spain | United Kingdom | |
2009 | 24.5 | 11.1 | 25.7 | 10.2 | 37.7 | 19.1 |
2010 | 28.1 | 9.8 | 33 | 11.1 | 41.5 | 19.9 |
2011 | 29.6 | 8.5 | 44.7 | 10 | 46.2 | 21.3 |
2012 | 30.8 | 8 | 55.3 | 11.7 | 52.9 | 21.2 |
2013 | 26.7 | 7.8 | 58.3 | 13.2 | 55.5 | 20.7 |
2014 | 23.4 | 7.7 | 52.4 | 12.7 | 53.2 | 17 |
2015 | 20.2 | 7.2 | 49.8 | 11.3 | 48.3 | 14.6 |
2016 | 16.8 | 7.1 | 47.3 | 10.8 | 44.4 | 13 |
2017 | 14.4 | 6.8 | 43.6 | 8.9 | 38.6 | 12.1 |
2018 | 13.8 | 6.2 | 39.9 | 7.2 | 34.3 | 11.3 |
Get the data: Eurostat database
Figure 2.40 shows the youth unemployment rate as a percentage of the labour force (also known as active population) for the period 2009-2018. Compared to the Netherlands and Germany, Ireland’s youth unemployment rate has been relatively high since 2009, but remains significantly lower than Spain and Greece.
Next Chapter: Auxiliary Indicators >>
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